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NEGLIGENCE - WHETHER COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY CROSSING
REGULATIONS CONSTITUTES DuE CARE ON PART OF RAILROAD - A series
of Minnesota statutes, passed from time to time regulating the conduct of railroads, were united in the laws of 1925.1 Among other things, this act empowers
the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to prescribe and order safety devices
at crossings. The plaintiff was injured when the car in which he was riding
hit defendant's train, which was already over the crossing. The evidence
showed that the street sloped steeply toward the track, but the track was somewhat elevated from thestreetlevelatthe crossing, so that the lights from the automobile could not shine on the train. Nor could the lights penetrate the darkness
and fog. The defendant had erected a reflector-type stop sign and cross-arm
warnings on the side of the street, in compliance with the order of the Railroad Commission. Held, mere compliance with the order of the commission
does not of itself constitute due care, since the act of 1925 was not intended to
be a code for the complete regulation of the conduct of railroads. The question
of negligence was one for the jury, to be decided from all the evidence pertaining to the crossing, safety-devices, and weather. Licha 'll. Northern Pac.
Ry., 201 Minn. 427,276 N. W. 813 (1937).
At common law, a railroad is under no duty to maintain a flagman or

1

Minn. Laws (1925), c. 336, Stat. (Mason, 1927), §§ 4743-1 to 4743-17.
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install safety devices at crossings. 2 But whether or not the failure to do so in a
particular situation constitutes negligence is a jury question which depends on
the nature of the crossing.3 It amounts to a question of due care under all the
circumstances of a particular case. When the legislature prescribes certain safety
devices, or delegates authority to a commission to prescribe them, and the railroad complies with such orders, the question arises whether or not such compliance amounts to due care of itself, or whether more is required on the part
of the railroad. The almost universal rule is that such regulations merely prescribe the minimum of due care, and that they do not absolve the railroad
from exercising further diligence at crossings commensurate with the dangers
involved to the traveling public.4 The reason given for the rule is that neither
the legislature nor the commission can arbitrarily set a standard of conduct
for every conceivable situation.5 Accordingly, if the commission is empowered
to make safety regulations but fails to do so, the railroad must nevertheless
exercise the due care and diligence required of it as at common law.6 Prior to
the enactment of the 1925 statute the Minnesota decisions were in accord with
the majority view.7 Thereafter, however, in a case substantially like the one
under discussion, the court held that by uniting the prior isolated statutes and
adding other provisions in the law of 1925, the legislature intended a code for
the complete rel;Ulation of railroads and that compliance therewith amounted to
due care. 8 The court in the present case, after a full consideration of the statute,
reverses its position and again brings that state in line with the majority rule.
It is submitted that the decision arrived at was very proper under the circum2 Stewart v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) 284 F. 716; Opp
v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 128 N. E. 580 (1920); Henry v. Boston & M. R.R., 125 Me.
366, 134 A. 193 (1926); Lawson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. R. R., 174 Minn.
404, 219 N. W. 554 (1928); Kulp Transp. Lines v. Erie R.R., 132 Misc. 821, 230
N. Y. S. 490 (1928).
8 Chesapeake & Ohio R. R. v. Dandridge, (C. C. A. 4th, 1909) 171 F. 74;
Engstrom v. Canadian Northern R. R., 153 Minn. 46, 189 N. W. 580, 190 N. W.
68 (1922); Gilliland v. Delaware & H. Co., 207 App. Div. 509, 202 N. Y. S. 710
(1924); WHARTON, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, 2d ed., § 798 (1878).
4 Grand Trunk Ry. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679 (1892); Dernberger
v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., (D. C. W. Va. 1917) 234 F. 405, affd. (C. C. A. 9th, 1917)
243 F. 21; Glanville v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R., 190 Iowa 174, 180 N. W. 152
(1920); St. Louis-SanFrancisco Ry. v. Prince, 145 Okla. 194, 291 P. 973 (1930);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Stanton, 78 Okla. 167, 189 P. 753 (1920); Grippen v.
New York Cent. Ry., 40 N. Y. 34 (1869); 22 R. C. L. 998 (1918); 2 THOMPSON,
NEGLIGENCE, 2d ed., § 1555 (1901).
5 Grand Trunk Ry. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679 (1892); 2 THoMPsoN, NEGLIGENCE, 2d ed., § 1555 (1901).
6 Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. v. Perkins, 125 Ill. 127, 17 N. E. 1 (1888); Chesapeake & 0. R. R. v. Gunter, 108 Ky. 362, 56 S. W. 527 (1900).
7 Shaber v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 28 Minn. 103 at 107-108, 9 N. W. 575
( 18 8 1) : "The specification by statute that certain precautions are to be taken is not
to be construed as a license to the company to omit other precautions that may be
necessary. . • ."
8 Olson v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 193 Minn. 533, 259 N. W. 70 (1935).
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stances. Unless the legislature makes its intent to the contrary clearly expressed,
it is unreasonable to imply that mere regulatory legislation is intended to supplant the complicated law of negligence at crossings, especially since it is a
problem involving the peculiarities of each crossing. This question of negligence
requires a careful consideration of weather, topography, population and density
of travel,-details almost impossible of codification.9 Unless clearly expressed,
it is inconceivable that a study by the commission of every possible situation
was intended, with a scheme of prescribed conduct and use of safety devices
for each. Moreover, as properly stated by the court, safety statutes and orders
of the commission are intended to add to the safety of individuals and not to
detract therefrom.10 Since the statute did not deal at all with the blowing of
whistles, lights on locomotive, backing locomotive, etc., which would be expected in a general code, such absence further fortifies the court's position that
a complete scheme of conduct abrogating common law rules was not intended.
Anthony L. Dividio

9 St. Louis, San Francisco Ry. v. Rundell, 108 Okla. 132, 235 P. 491 (1925);
Gilliland v. Delaware & H. Co., 207 App. Div. 509, 202 N. Y. S. 710 (1924);
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R. v. Dandridge, (C. C. A. 4th, 1909) 171 F. 64.
10 Principal case, Licha v. Northern Pac. Ry., (Minn. 1937) 276 N. W. 813.

